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Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law
David Scheffer*
The following article is the author’s written testimony submitted to the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, on October 6, 2009, for a hearing entitled, “No Safe Haven:
Accountability for Human Rights Violators, Part II.” The author had testified
on November 14, 2007, in a related hearing to examine why the United States
remains a safe haven from prosecution for major human rights violators of
foreign citizenship. Following that hearing, Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL),
the chairman of the subcommittee, and Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), its
ranking member, co-sponsored legislation, which became law, aimed at
closing gaps in federal statutes related to the commission of certain crimes
outside the United States. This second submission of testimony focuses
particularly on the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009, introduced in July
2009 by Senators Durbin, Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Russ Feingold (D-WI).
This legislation would introduce into federal law a broader set of criminal
offenses pertaining to both U.S. citizens and aliens who visit or reside in the
United States.
¶1

¶2

I wish to thank Chairman Richard Durbin, the ranking member, Senator Tom
Coburn, and the other members of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate for the opportunity to present written
testimony in connection with the Subcommittee’s hearing on October 6, 2009, entitled
“No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators: Part II.” I teach
international criminal law and international human rights law at Northwestern University
School of Law, where I also direct the Center for International Human Rights. I am a
former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001).
When I last testified before the subcommittee, in November 2007,1 there were
numerous gaps in U.S. federal law that prevented the prosecution of various types of
cases pertaining to three categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity (which
include torture and, as a crime of persecution, ethnic cleansing), and war crimes (which
also include torture). I have long described these three major categories as “atrocity
crimes” for ease of reference and to more accurately convey and emphasize the
* David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and the Director of the Center
for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law. He is the faculty adviser of the
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights and previously served as the U.S.
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001).
1 No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the United States: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of David Scheffer, Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law, Northwestern University
School of Law, Chicago, Ill.), available at
http://judicary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3028&wit_id=6778.
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jurisprudential development of such crimes in the international and hybrid criminal
tribunals since 1993.2 I am reiterating in this testimony much of what I conveyed two
years ago because, while the situation has changed (and I will note progress below), some
of the fundamental points I raised remain and require further examination by the
subcommittee. There also has been a major development with the introduction of the
Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009,3 which I examine later in this testimony.
I will not address human rights violations that do not rise to the level of magnitude
and criminality found in the atrocity crimes or the gaps that may exist under U.S. federal
law with respect to other violations of international human rights law. The latter would
be a very extensive undertaking beyond the scope of my testimony. There is a rich and
continuing line of civil cases under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (“ATS”),4 a truly
unique American law, dealing with various human rights violations and seeking civil
damages only, and the Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991 (“TVPA”),5 which again
only permits civil damages with respect to acts of torture. I will refrain from examining
ATS or TVPA litigation in this testimony; here I focus exclusively on criminal law and
military law and how to ensure that U.S. law sufficiently empowers U.S. courts with
appropriate jurisdiction to investigate and judge the culpability of alleged perpetrators of
atrocity crimes.
I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The United States must eliminate any possibility that it would remain a
safe haven for war criminals and other perpetrators of atrocities who reach
American shores and seek to avoid accountability for atrocity crimes. The
United States must further demonstrate its willingness to hold its own citizens
accountable for atrocity crimes as a commitment to the rule of law and to
America’s rejection of impunity for such crimes regardless of who may be
investigated at any level of civilian control or military command.
(2) The passage and enactment of the Genocide Accountability Act,6 the
Child Soldiers Accountability Act,7 and the Trafficking in Persons
Accountability Act8 demonstrated the will of the Congress within the past
two years to shut down the United States as a sanctuary for perpetrators of
genocide anywhere in the world, for recruiters and users of child soldiers
anywhere in the world, and for traffickers in persons anywhere in the world.
2

The international and hybrid criminal tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi High Tribunal, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court. The term
“atrocity crimes” is explained in David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1.3 Genocide Stud. &
Prevention 229 (2006); and David Scheffer, The Merits of Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity
Law,’ 2.1 Genocide Stud. & Prevention 91 (2007).
3 Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009, S. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
5 Id.
6 Genocide Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2007).
7 Child Soldiers Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 118, 213 (2008).
8 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 223, 122 Stat. 5044
(2008).
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There should be consistent application of the rules of jurisdiction in the
coverage of atrocity crimes in the federal criminal code, including application
to all U.S. citizens, to U.S. government employees and contractors, and to all
aliens present in U.S. territory for the commission of atrocity crimes
anywhere in the world.
(3) Continue to eliminate from U.S. law all statutes of limitations for atrocity
crimes.
(4) Amend the federal criminal code, title 18 of the U.S. Code, so that it
enables U.S. courts to prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes that
are already codified in the statutes of the international and hybrid criminal
tribunals and are defined as part of customary international law. The Crimes
Against Humanity Act of 2009 represents a significant development in
advancing this goal.
(5) Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, title 10 of the U.S. Code, so
that U.S. courts-martial and military commissions can more effectively and
unambiguously prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes that are
already codified in the statutes of the international and hybrid criminal
tribunals and defined as part of customary international law.
(6) Recognize that until such amendments to titles 10 and 18 of the U.S.
Code are enacted, the United States has an antiquated criminal code and
military code. Further recognize that the United States stands at a
comparative disadvantage with many of its major allies that have modernized
their national criminal codes in recent years with incorporation of the atrocity
crimes, in part so as to shield their nationals from investigation and
prosecution by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) by demonstrating
national ability to prosecute such crimes and thus invoke the ICC’s principle
of complementarity, which defers to national investigations and prosecutions.
Paradoxically, even as a non-party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (the
“Rome Statute”),9 the United States today essentially stands more exposed to
its jurisdiction than do American allies that have modernized their criminal
codes.
II. INTRODUCTION
¶4

In general, U.S. federal criminal law and military law have become comparatively
antiquated during the last seventeen years in their respective coverage of atrocity crimes,
while international criminal law has evolved significantly during that period. The
prospects of U.S. courts exercising jurisdiction (subject matter, territorial, personal,
passive, or protective jurisdiction) over atrocity crimes under current law remain
relatively poor. U.S. Attorneys, in even the best of jurisdictional circumstances, appear
9

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on
July 1, 2002) [hereinafter the Rome Statute].
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not to have pursued the types of investigations and possible prosecutions one might
expect if there were an aggressive commitment to bringing perpetrators of atrocity crimes
to justice and if the law provided a clear basis for such prosecutions.10 Similar problems
exist with respect to military courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(“UCMJ”).11 A considerable number of nations have leapt far ahead of the United States
in terms of their national courts being able to investigate and prosecute the full range of
atrocity crimes.12
In contrast, the United States remains an available safe haven for war criminals and
other perpetrators of atrocity crimes who need not fear prosecution before U.S. courts for
the commission of crimes against humanity or war crimes under most circumstances if
they reach U.S. territory either legally or illegally. Indeed, the fact remains that U.S.
citizens and U.S. government employees and contractors who may commit certain
atrocity crimes not covered in federal law or common crimes for which there is no
extraterritorial jurisdiction may entirely escape any prosecution in the United States.
Experiences of recent years with security contractors in Iraq, such as Blackwater USA
(now Xe Services LLP) and DynCorp International, are examples of this dilemma.13 The
hypothetical possibilities, if not realities, arising from this shortcoming in U.S. federal
law should be deeply disturbing to any rule of law society.
Before examining the gaps in U.S. federal law regarding atrocity crimes, the
significant progress made by this subcommittee during 2007 and 2008 regarding three
new laws should be recognized. The Genocide Accountability Act, which Chairman
10

The notable exception has been the sole case (against Emmanuel “Chuckie” Taylor, the former leader of
Liberia’s Anti-Terrorism Unit) prosecuted under the Criminal Torture Statute (10 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006))
since its enactment in 1994.
11 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006). While it remains true that atrocity
crimes likely could be prosecuted as multiple counts of common crimes under the UCMJ (such as genocide
as multiple counts of murder or crimes against humanity as cruelty and maltreatment), the UCMJ does not
provide for the specific atrocity crimes. The military prosecutor is left pondering whether to charge an
atrocity crime under the general authority of UCMJ Article 18 or Article 134, which in fact are antiquated
options rarely, if ever, employed.
12 Examples include the United Kingdom (International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, pt. 5, May 11,
2001); Australia (International Criminal Court Act 2002, consequential amends., June 28, 2002); Canada
(Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000, ch. 24, June 29, 2000); Germany (Code of Crimes
Against International Law, June 30, 2002); The Netherlands (International Crimes Act 2003, June 19,
2003); New Zealand (International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, October 1, 2000);
Argentina (ICC Implementation Law, Law #26200, Jan. 5, 2007); Spain (The Organic Act 15/2003, Nov.
25, 2003); South Africa (Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of
2002, July 18, 2002); Norway (Lov om endringer i straffeloven 20. mai 2005 nr. 28 mv., skjerpende og
formildende omstendigheter, folkemord, rikets selvstendighet, terrorhandlinger, ro, orden og sikkerhet, og
offentlig myndighet, 7 mars 2008 nr. 4. [The Criminal Code, ch. 16, Mar. 7, 2008]); and Finland
(212/2008 Laki rikoslain muuttamisesta [Law Amending the Penal Code] May 1, 2008). Other countries
that have enacted amendments to their criminal codes to incorporate crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Rome Statute include Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Costa Rica,
Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Georgia, Mali, Malta, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago. Relevant laws available at
http://www.legal-tools.org/en/access-to-the-tools/national-implementing-legislation-database/. Nations that
are state parties to the Rome Statute and have considered or are in the process of legislating incorporation
of atrocity crimes into their respective criminal codes include France, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, and Brazil.
13 James Vicini, Blackwater Guards Charged in Iraq Ahooting, REUTERS, Dec. 8, 2008, available at
http://reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4B73YS20081208; Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer,
Blackwater Case Highlights Legal Uncertainties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1; Hearing on Private
Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Before the House of Rep. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Durbin and Senator Coburn originally co-sponsored, closed a critical gap in U.S. law
regarding the crime of genocide. Whereas past law permitted only the prosecution of a
U.S. national who commits genocide anywhere in the world or an alien who commits
genocide in the United States, the Genocide Accountability Act ensures that U.S. courts
can judge any alien who commits genocide anywhere in the world provided that alien is
found in the United States. The law closed the gap that used to create a safe haven in the
United States for alleged alien perpetrators of genocide who managed to reach U.S.
territory.14
The Child Soldiers Accountability Act, also originally co-sponsored by Chairman
Durbin and Senator Coburn, closed a glaring gap in U.S. law regarding child soldiers.
The law criminalizes (1) recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers
(less than fifteen years of age) in the United States by anyone, and (2) recruitment,
enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers (less than fifteen years of age) anywhere
in the world by a U.S. national or any alien present in the United States. It also renders
any alien engaged in such conduct inadmissible to the United States or deportable from
the United States. Formerly, there was no prohibition under U.S. federal law to the
recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers under fifteen years of age,
thus providing safe haven to any alien in U.S. territory who engaged in such conduct and
granted peace of mind to any American who recruited or used children under fifteen years
of age anywhere in the world. This type of criminal conduct is prohibited under
modernized criminal statutes in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, and Argentina (which raised the
minimum age to eighteen) and in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome
Statute.
The Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2008, which was enacted as part
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act at the end of 2008, shuts down
the United States as a sanctuary for any citizen or any alien lawfully admitted or
otherwise present in the United States who engaged in sex trafficking, slavery, forced
labor, involuntary servitude, or peonage anywhere in the world. This new law closed the
gap in U.S. law that permitted such prosecutions only of U.S. citizens charged with
human trafficking conducted anywhere in the world and of aliens who engaged in human
trafficking in the United States. Now aliens who arrive in the United States and who are
14

This dilemma was glaringly apparent in two of my own experiences as Ambassador at Large for War
Crimes Issues. The first was the inability to consider charging Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, who was indicted
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and arrested in Laredo, Texas in December 1996, in
federal court with the crime of genocide in the event he successfully blocked his transfer to the ICTR to
stand trial in Arusha, Tanzania. Since he was an alien who was charged with committing genocide outside
the United States, U.S. law barred prosecuting him for genocide. If we had not prevailed in federal court to
uphold our authority to transfer him, he would have lived a free man in the United States. The federal
litigation spanned four years: Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997); In re
Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998); Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir.
1999); Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000). The second experience concerned Pol Pot, whom we
had wanted to have the option of bringing to the United States to stand trial for crimes against humanity
and genocide in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 in the event he could have been apprehended prior to his
death in 1998. The Department of Justice advised that U.S. courts probably would have no jurisdiction over
Pol Pot, and thus we had to seek a foreign jurisdiction, which proved very time-consuming, where he could
be transported if captured. In the end, time spent trying to overcome U.S. jurisdictional inadequacies
enhanced Pol Pot’s chances of avoiding imminent capture and eliminated the opportunity to move more
decisively against him.
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responsible for trafficking of persons outside the United States are subject to
investigation and prosecution for such actions.
¶9
Unfortunately, genocide, the recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child
soldiers, and trafficking in persons comprise only a fraction of atrocity crimes, and the
United States remains an actual or potential safe haven for perpetrators of a great many of
the atrocity crimes that can now be prosecuted in a number of foreign jurisdictions and
before the international and hybrid criminal tribunals. The recently-introduced Crimes
Against Humanity Act of 2009, which will be examined in detail below, incorporates the
trafficking crimes covered by the new law, albeit with the much higher threshold of
gravity required for the prosecution of crimes against humanity.
¶10
On a related front, it would be fallacious to assume that the United States
necessarily could rely only upon its bilateral extradition treaties to resolve the impunity
gap for a wide range of crimes against humanity and war crimes because (1) most
extradition treaties require that the crime at issue (and for which the individual would be
extradited to stand trial) must be punishable under the laws of both Contracting States,
and many of the atrocity crimes are not punishable in either of the Contracting States,
including the United States, (2) one can safely conclude that many of the jurisdictions
that could exercise jurisdiction over an alleged alien perpetrator of an atrocity crime or a
common war criminal, and with which the United States has an extradition treaty, cannot
be relied upon to seek extradition of the individual from the United States and guarantee
credible prosecution of him or her, and (3) the United States has bilateral extradition
treaties with just over 100 foreign jurisdictions, meaning that with respect to the almost
100 other nations, there is no option for extradition pursuant to a treaty obligation.
¶11
Beyond the recent developments in legislation described above, there is a broader
landscape upon which well-recognized crimes against humanity and war crimes are
absent from the federal criminal code (title 18 of the U.S. Code) and from the U.S.
military code (title 10 of the U.S. Code). These gaps in U.S. law have become much
more pronounced in recent years as other jurisdictions, particularly among America’s
major allies, have modernized their criminal codes. In this testimony, I will examine both
title 18 and title 10 and how the two titles of the U.S. Code should be more coherently
inter-related and strengthened. But first the stage should be set with the jurisdictional
reach of U.S. law for atrocity crimes.
III. JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF U.S. LAW
¶12

Generally absent from U.S. law is the kind of jurisdictional regime that would
provide the most pragmatic sphere of coverage to ensure that perpetrators of atrocity
crimes cannot find safe haven in the United States. Current U.S. law on atrocity crimes
typically exhibits a narrow range of jurisdiction, covering actions of U.S. citizens
(although not necessarily if such action takes place abroad) or crimes which occur in U.S.
territory. There is an expansive use of extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, and hostage-taking criminal laws, but similar extraterritorial applications have
not yet reached atrocity crimes under U.S. law. This shortfall has begun to be covered by
the Genocide Accountability Act, the Child Soldiers Accountability Act, and the
Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act, but other massive criminal conduct remains
unregulated by federal law.
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The gaps in U.S. law would be filled most pragmatically and effectively if the
following jurisdictional criteria were established:
Territorial jurisdiction: The crime has occurred in the United States or in any
foreign territory under the effective control of U.S. authorities (including
occupied territory and U.S. military facilities) or, if another jurisdictional
prong described below exists, anywhere else in the world.
Personal jurisdiction: The alleged perpetrator is a U.S. citizen or U.S.
government employee or contractor acting anywhere in the world or an alien
who is present in U.S. territory with respect to any commission of an atrocity
crime anywhere in the world.
Subject matter jurisdiction: The crime is an atrocity crime, namely genocide,
a crime against humanity, or a war crime as such crimes are defined under
U.S. law15 and/or international law in terms of their magnitude and
systematic or planned character.
Passive personality jurisdiction: Federal jurisdiction should be triggered in
respect of any American citizen who is a victim of an atrocity crime
anywhere in the world and thus reach any perpetrator of an atrocity crime
against such American victim.
Protective jurisdiction: Where U.S. interests abroad are directly threatened by
an atrocity crime, U.S. courts should have the power to prosecute alleged
perpetrators of any such crime. Such U.S. interests include threats to U.S.
citizens, U.S. diplomatic and military facilities and assets, and U.S.
sovereignty interests.

¶14

I have already addressed progress with respect to the crimes of genocide,
recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers, and trafficking in persons,
for which laws have been enacted within the last two years. I will concentrate the rest of
my testimony on crimes against humanity and war crimes.
IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

¶15

Crimes against humanity, as they are now defined in the statutes of the international
and hybrid criminal tribunals and in modernized criminal codes of many foreign
jurisdictions, require a particular context: that, with some exceptions, the individual crime
is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy. U.S. federal criminal law provides for the prosecution of
some underlying substantive crimes found in the now conventional list of crimes against
humanity, but federal law does not generally specify distinct criminal liability based on
the extent of the planned attack or the link to State policy.
15 In this testimony, I examine continued amendment of U.S. law so that it incorporates the full range of
atrocity crimes.
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U.S. law certainly provides the means to prosecute as common crimes such acts as
murder, torture, slavery, kidnapping, sexual abuse, or rape under narrowly-defined
circumstances set forth in title 18 of the U.S. Code.16 But none of these codified crimes in
title 18 carry the additional requirements distinguishing crimes against humanity from
common crimes. Nor does title 18 include some of the well-established crimes against
humanity, even as common crimes, which constitute the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals and the international and hybrid criminal
tribunals of the last seventeen years,17 as well as the modernized criminal codes of some
American allies.18
¶17
Furthermore, there is generally no extraterritorial application of title 18 common
crimes; although there are some exceptions, U.S. courts are typically unable to prosecute
an American citizen or an alien who is in the United States for alleged commission of
either a title 18 common crime outside the United States or a crime against humanity
outside the United States. These are huge gaps in U.S. law which would permit alien
atrocity warlords to find safe haven in the United States and which deny U.S. courts the
ability to prosecute American citizens who commit crimes against humanity anywhere in
the world. This is the case even though prosecution under statutory circumstances of the
common crime of murder or rape or torture or slavery or kidnapping or sexual abuse,
typically with a single victim or very few victims, may provide a measure of justice. But
such common crime prosecutions fall far short of what a successful prosecution of a
crime against humanity, with multiple victims (sometimes in the tens of thousands),
would entail and what it would signify as America’s commitment to the rule of law.
¶18
Federal criminal law also has statutes of limitations that generally confine
indictments to a five-year window following commission of the crime unless it is a
capital offense.19 Such statutes of limitations have been abandoned in international and
much foreign practice in light of the magnitude and serious character of crimes against
humanity. Leaders engaged in such conduct and shielded by their continuing control of
the government and law enforcement authorities (particularly in autocratic states)
typically will not be exposed to apprehension or be inclined to surrender to the courts for
prosecution within such a relatively short period following commission of a crime against
humanity.20
16 Inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder); § 2340 (torture); § 1584 (sale into involuntary servitude); § 1589
(forced labor); § 1201 (kidnapping); § 2242 (sexual abuse); § 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse).
17 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6(c),
Aug. 8 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Charter for the International Military Tribunal of the Far
East, art. 5(c), Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (1968); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); See
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145;
Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 12, Oct. 18, 2005, available at
www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf; Rome Statute, supra note 10,
art. 7.
18 See supra note 13.
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
20 None of the international or hybrid criminal tribunals have any comparable statute of limitations on the
prosecution of crimes falling within their jurisdiction. Further, there are no statutes of limitations in the
modernized criminal codes covering atrocity crimes of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France (for
“serious crimes,” defined by the French Constitutional Court as so serious as to be of concern to the
international community as a whole), Germany, the Netherlands (except for the least serious war crimes
which are limited to 12 years), New Zealand, and South Africa.
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The stark reality is that under U.S. federal law, there is no provision for any crime
against humanity per se, meaning there is no defined and codified crime that must be
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or
organizational policy to commit such attack, and which constitutes the multiple
commission of any of the following acts, as they are criminalized under Article 7 of the
Rome Statute:

















¶20
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murder;
extermination;
enslavement;
deportation or forcible transfer of population;
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty;
torture;
rape;
sexual slavery;
enforced prostitution;
forced pregnancy;
enforced sterilization;
sexual violence;
persecution;
enforced disappearance of persons;
apartheid; or
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

Such crimes against humanity have been defined and incorporated in the criminal
codes of Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa,
Spain, Argentina, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom. 21 These countries
previously had been in similar circumstances as the United States but, because of their
participation in the ICC, they modernized their criminal codes so as to enable themselves
to prosecute the same crimes as are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC.
Under the principle of complementarity found in the Rome Statute,22 a nation’s ability
and willingness to prosecute the same crimes as found in ICC jurisdiction essentially
shields that nation’s nationals from ICC scrutiny. Paradoxically, some of America’s
allies, as states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, now are more insulated from ICC
investigation than is the United States, even as a non-party to the Rome Statute, because
our allies have modernized their criminal codes to fully incorporate genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes for possible investigation and prosecution against
alleged civilian and military perpetrators.23
21

See supra note 13.
Rome Statute, supra note 10, arts. 17-19.
23 See Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001) (This article received the
American Bar Association’s military writing award); see also Michael P. Hatchell, Closing the Gaps in
United States Law and Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 183 (2005).
22
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It is certainly possible, without amending the law, to cherry pick one’s way through
Title 18 and cobble together barely plausible examples of common crimes, such as the
federal kidnapping statute,24 that could be prosecuted in the spirit of a particular crime
against humanity, such as imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of the fundamental rules of international law. But U.S. attorneys would have to
become exceptionally innovative, and take considerable risks in the courtroom, to
prosecute one of the common crimes under Title 18 as a crime against humanity. There
has not yet been a single federal criminal prosecution of a crime against humanity as
such, despite the presence of many aliens on U.S. territory who may qualify for
investigation for such crimes.
¶22
A similar predicament arises when examining how a crime against humanity would
be prosecuted against military personnel in U.S. military courts. There is no provision in
the UCMJ that explicitly codifies a crime against humanity.25 It would be a stretch, and
entail similar risks, for a military prosecutor to seek to refashion the common crimes set
forth in the UCMJ, with their narrow definitions and relatively short (typically five year)
statutes of limitations,26 into full-fledged crimes against humanity. Since there is no
UCMJ crime that could easily be translated into, for example, the crime against humanity
of persecution or of enslavement or of enforced disappearance of persons, U.S. military
courts are without the power to prosecute military personnel under any circumstances for
some crimes against humanity that do not interface with any of the common crimes set
forth in the UCMJ.
¶23
In fact, there exists no explicit authority under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to
prosecute any crime against humanity as a stand-alone codified crime. This means that it
may prove very difficult to frame relevant charges (thus requiring resort to charges of
common crimes) against any suspected perpetrators of crimes against humanity who are
U.S. military personnel anywhere in the chain of command, including at the highest
levels of military leadership. The prosecutor’s alternative would be to charge one of the
UCMJ’s common crimes, which may fall far short of a crime against humanity charge.
While an antiquated notion of military justice—focusing on common crimes and a
general jurisdiction over war crimes—may remain useful under the UCMJ, the inability
of U.S. military lawyers to bring an explicit crime against humanity charge may enable
the individual to escape liability under U.S. law while exposing such individual to the
scrutiny of a foreign court (with a modernized criminal code and where the crime may
have allegedly occurred) or international or hybrid criminal tribunals that are familiar
with the prosecution of crimes against humanity regarding military personnel and
exercise vigorous jurisdiction over such crimes. Much of the litigation before the
international criminal tribunals involves indictments that charge individuals with both
crimes against humanity and war crimes against military commanders, and there have
been convictions for commission of both types of crimes.27 Ideally, Title 10 of the U.S.
24

18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).
26 10 U.S.C. § 843 (2006).
27 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 741-3 (May 7, 1997)
(defendant charged with and convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Jelisic,
Case No. IT-95-10, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 58 (Dec. 14, 1999) (defendant charged with and convicted
of crimes against humanity and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 638, 645 (Sep. 2, 1998) (defendant charged with crimes against humanity and
25
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Code would be amended so as to enable military lawyers to bring full-bodied crimes
against humanity charges against U.S. military personnel and thus deflect any foreign or
international tribunal scrutiny of any such alleged conduct by an American serviceman.
¶24
Under federal criminal law, the United States remains in large measure a free haven
for perpetrators of crimes against humanity. This is particularly true of any alien who is
found on U.S. territory and who may have perpetrated a crime against humanity outside
the United States. It is also largely true of any U.S. citizen who may perpetrate a crime
against humanity overseas or, if responsible for one in U.S. territory, may only be charged
with a common crime that does not reflect the magnitude or importance of the atrocity
crime for which he or she should be held accountable.
V. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ACT OF 2009
¶25

Fortunately, help is on the way. Senators Durbin, Patrick Leahy, and Russ Feingold
introduced S. 1346, The Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 on June 24, 2009. The
purpose of the legislation is to penalize crimes against humanity and it thus marks a
significant advancement in closing the impunity gap in U.S. law for atrocity crimes. It
remains a limited piece of legislation as the bill covers many but not all crimes against
humanity.28 The bill hews closely to established common crimes under the federal
criminal code and adds to them the gravity context required for a charge of crimes against
humanity. This approach differs from the way in which our major allies have revised
their criminal codes to incorporate crimes against humanity, as they have incorporated the
more explicitly stated and defined crimes against humanity known to international law.
Nonetheless, the bill serves the worthy objective of penalizing a good number of crimes
against humanity and ensuring that the United States is no sanctuary for those who
commit such crimes anywhere in the world.
¶26
Interestingly, S. 1346 requires in the gravity, or magnitude, requirement for crimes
against humanity that the crime be “part of a widespread and systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, and with knowledge of the attack. . . .” The only novel
part of this definition, for which I do not know the drafters’ rationale, is the conjunctive
pairing of “widespread and systematic” in describing the nature of the attack. On its face,
this appears to create a high hurdle to leap over to prosecute a suspect, for it requires
proof of two factors regarding the attack: that it is pursuant to or in furtherance of a
policy of a state or armed group and that it results in multiple victims. A random,
unplanned slaughter of civilians by a crazed warlord may not qualify because the
“policy” for such an attack cannot be established. Alternatively, a highly planned state
violations of the Geneva Conventions); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber
Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 403-445 (Dec. 6, 1999) (defendant charged with crimes against humanity and
violations of the Geneva Conventions).
28 For example, the bill fails to explicitly incorporate the well established crimes against humanity of
deportation or forcible transfer of population (other than in the context of “national, ethnic, racial, or
religious cleansing”), enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, persecution (other than in the context of
“national, ethnic, racial, or religious cleansing”), enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid, and “other
inhumane acts of a similar character (regarding all crimes against humanity) causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d), (g)(k). There may be good reason in the future to address this lingering gap in federal law on crimes against
humanity in the event the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 is not amended prior to passage to include
such crimes.
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policy to exterminate an ethnic minority may be within hours of implementation, but may
be aborted for any number of reasons, leaving the suspects free to plot again and perhaps
succeed the next time. Since no multiple victims resulted (as the policy was not
activated), the suspects could not be prosecuted under the Bill’s formulation of the crime
against humanity of extermination. All of the definitions for crimes against humanity in
the statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia, and the ICC employ the disjunctive and require that the attack
be “widespread or systematic,” thus enabling those courts to prosecute individuals who
either cause multiple victims to suffer or act pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy to
commit such crime.
¶27
The point I am making, however, may be a distinction without a difference. The
Rome Statute essentially pairs the two words together even though it uses the formula of
“widespread or systematic” in its definition of crimes against humanity. The union
occurs in that part of the definition that requires there to be an “attack directed against
any civilian population.” Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines “attack directed
against any civilian population” to mean “a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [the listing of crimes against humanity]
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack. . . .” It would be difficult to accomplish the required attack
against a civilian population and satisfy the definitional requirements of the Rome Statute
without both the commission of multiple acts (hence “widespread”) and a state or
organizational policy driving such an attack.29 The identical formulation is repeated in
the Introduction to Crimes Against Humanity in the Elements of Crimes to the Rome
Statute.30
¶28
The judgments delivered by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have emphasized the disjunctive nature of the definition, but the
facts usually point to the reality that a widespread attack on a civilian population arises
from some kind of policy or plan, even if either is inferred, or because the state tolerates
the atrocities of non-governmental actors. The policy, plan, or ambivalence or inaction of
the State drives the killing machine toward a widespread attack on civilians.31 In light of
the statutory formulation in the Rome Statute, which points to a closer bond between a
“widespread” and a “systematic” attack on a civilian population, S. 1346 should not be
read as a radical departure from international law. In fact, the legislation may reflect a

29

See WILLIAM SHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 101-104 (2006) [hereinafter
SCHABAS].
30 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, Crimes Against
Humanity, Introduction, §3.
31 See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 543-555 (Jan. 14, 2000)
(“National case law tends, in particular, to emphasise that crimes against humanity are usually the
manifestation of a criminal governmental policy . . . While crimes against humanity are normally
perpetrated by State organs, i.e. individuals acting in an official capacity such as military commanders,
servicemen, etc., there may be cases where the authors of such crimes are individuals having neither
official status nor acting on behalf of a governmental authority. The available case law seems to indicate
that in these cases some sort of explicit or implicit approval or endorsement by State or governmental
authorities is required, or else that it is necessary for the offence to be clearly encouraged by a general
governmental policy or to clearly fit within such a policy.”).
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more realistic understanding of what constitutes the magnitude requirements for a crime
against humanity under international law.
¶29
The Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 codifies sixteen separate crimes against
humanity. The logic behind twelve of the crimes derives from their current status as
common crimes in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. S. 1346 simply attaches the gravity
requirement for a crime against humanity (“widespread and systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, and with knowledge of the attack”) to the common crime
so as to codify it as a crime against humanity. The common crimes are murder,32
peonage,33 kidnapping or carrying away individuals for involuntary servitude or slavery,34
involuntary servitude,35 forced labor,36 trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or forced labor,37 sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or
coercion,38 aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat,39 sexual abuse,40 kidnapping,41
hostage taking,42 and torture.43 The crime of peonage in the United States is associated
with holding workers in servitude, particularly in southeastern states. “Peonage” is not a
term that has migrated into the lexicon of crimes against humanity in the modern era.
¶30
Nonetheless, although expressed somewhat differently in several instances, the
other federal crimes listed immediately above can be associated with well-known crimes
against humanity under international law, as confirmed in the statutes of the international
and hybrid criminal tribunals exercising jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. The
fact that the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 does not establish a mirror image of
all of the crimes against humanity set forth in the Rome Statute and the statutes of other
tribunals should not detract from the significant progress represented by the legislation in
closing gaps in federal law with respect to atrocity crimes.
¶31
The new crimes introduced by the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009, which do
not currently appear in the federal criminal code, are extermination, national, ethnic,
racial, or religious cleansing, arbitrary detention, and imposed measures intended to
prevent births. The crime against humanity of extermination is well established in
international law and is found in all of the statutes of the tribunals.44 Extermination has
been prosecuted successfully in many cases before the tribunals. The legislation provides
that the crime of extermination “means subjecting a civilian population to conditions of
life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part.”
The Rome Statute, employing similar terminology, defines the crime of extermination as
including “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of
32

18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006).
34 18 U.S.C. § 1583(a)(1) (2006).
35 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a) (2006).
36 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2006).
37 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2006).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2006).
39 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006).
40 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006).
43 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
44 See ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 216-17 (2008) [hereinafter
ZAHAR & SLUITER]; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 109-110 (2nd ed. 2008)
[hereinafter CASSESE]; SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 199-201.
33
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access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population.”45
¶32
Arbitrary detention falls naturally under the crime against humanity of
imprisonment in international law and in the tribunal statutes. The Rome Statute
elaborates with a description of “imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law.”46 The jurisprudence of the
tribunals focuses essentially on charges of arbitrary detention against defendants that
involve prolonged imprisonment without due process of law.47 The definition for
“arbitrary detention” provided for in the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009
establishes a direct connection to international law, as it describes the term as meaning
“imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as are established by the law of the jurisdiction where
such imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty took place.” Thus, a
crime against humanity of arbitrary detention should serve a comparable purpose in
federal law as that found in international law for the crime against humanity of
imprisonment.
¶33
The crime against humanity of “imposed measures intended to prevent births”
would appear to be most directly aligned with the crime against humanity of “enforced
sterilization” in the Rome Statute,48 which, however, does not define the term. But the
words used in the Rome Statute logically describe imposed measures intended to prevent
births, so the correlation exists between the legislation and the Rome Statute. The
Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute require that the crime against humanity of
enforced sterilization occurs where the perpetrator deprived one or more persons of
biological reproductive capacity, the conduct was neither justified by the medical or
hospital treatment of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine
consent, the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population, and the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of, or
intended the conduct to be part of, a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population.49 Although the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 does not
import these elements, or use any definition, to describe “imposed measures intended to
prevent births,” the Rome Statute offers useful guidance for how this crime is intended to
be interpreted under international law and thus how U.S. courts might address the issue.
¶34
The proposed crime against humanity of “national, ethnic, racial, or religious
cleansing,” which is more commonly referred to simply as “ethnic cleansing,” is not a
crime as such under international law. The term does not appear in any of the tribunal
statutes and no tribunal has convicted anyone for the crime of ethnic cleansing. But the
term ethnic cleansing has been employed in the judgments of the tribunals to describe the
practical result of the well-established crime against humanity of persecution. This
understanding of the crime against of humanity of persecution is so significant today that
“ethnic cleansing” has become essentially synonymous in meaning with “persecution.”50
45

Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(b).
Id. at art. 7(1)(e).
47 See CASSESE, supra note 45, at 110-111; SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 205.
48 Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 7(1)(g); see SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 211, 214.
49 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(g)-5.
50 See ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 45, at 211-215.
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The Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 leaps into the self-evident reality of ethnic
cleansing as a crime against humanity rather than using the more conventional
terminology of persecution as a crime against humanity, the latter term having become a
complex definitional formula buried deep within tribunal jurisprudence and by which the
tribunals have prosecuted and convicted individuals for what the rest of the world
understands to be ethnic cleansing.
¶35
The legislation defines “national, ethnic, racial, or religious cleansing” to mean “the
intentional and forced displacement from one country to another or within a country of
any national group, ethnic group, racial group, or religious group in whole or in part, by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, except
when the displacement is in accordance with applicable laws of armed conflict that
permit involuntary and temporary displacement of a population to ensure its security or
when imperative military reasons so demand.” The prohibitive part of this definition
comports with what the world witnessed in recent years in the Balkans and in Darfur and
during the 1980s and 1990s in Iraq. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, in particular, has determined frequently in its judgments that such expulsion
or other coercive acts against an ethnic or religious group occurred frequently, and
defendants have been prosecuted and convicted for planning and executing such acts.
But the charges and convictions have combined the crime against humanity of
persecutions with other crimes against humanity, such as deportation, torture,
imprisonment, rape, and extermination, to cover what is more commonly described as
ethnic cleansing. The legislation achieves essentially the same aim but does so more
frontally by employing the term “cleansing” (paired with “national, ethnic, racial, or
religious”) and by describing “expulsion or other coercive acts” as the means by which to
achieve ethnic cleansing. The bill does not resort to the formula in the practice of the
tribunals and in the Rome Statute itself that links “persecution” with the other crimes
against humanity set forth in the relevant statute before obtaining a conviction on the
“persecution” charge, even though the task before the tribunal judges is one of finding
criminal responsibility for what is popularly called “ethnic cleansing.”
¶36
Another primary issue is found in Section 519(d) of the Crimes Against Humanity
Act of 2009, which denies any statute of limitations for the crimes set forth in the
proposed law. This conforms to a similar denial of any statute of limitations in the
genocide provisions of the federal criminal code.51 There is no statute of limitations for
crimes against humanity under any of the tribunal statutes,52 so in that respect the
legislation is well positioned to ensure that the United States can investigate and
prosecute crimes against humanity as a matter of domestic law and consistent with the
principle of complementarity in the event and whenever the ICC seeks to exercise
jurisdiction in a matter that falls within U.S. jurisdiction. However, the Child Soldiers
Accountability Act imposes a statute of limitations requiring the indictment or
information “not later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.”53
¶37
It is entirely possible to categorize the recruitment or use of child soldiers as part of
a crime against humanity, particularly where such action relates to murder, kidnapping,
involuntary servitude, forced labor, slavery, sexual abuse, or torture. There probably
51

18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006).
See discussion in note 21.
53 18 U.S.C. § 213 (2006).
52
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would be no insurmountable obstacle to charging child soldier recruitment or use within
the parameters of a crime against humanity, which would benefit from unlimited time to
file charges. But this is not the cleanest formulation. There would be greater consistency
in the context of atrocity crimes and filling gaps in U.S. law if the statute of limitations
were eliminated from the Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008.
¶38
Under current law, a guerrilla warlord who massively recruits and uses thousands
of child soldiers in Africa may, only eleven years later, safely reside in the United States
as an alien for the purpose of finding sanctuary from prosecution elsewhere. Passage of
the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 at least would expose such person to possible
prosecution in U.S. courts for a crime against humanity. But it would be far preferable
simply to close the loophole in the Child Soldiers Accountability Act, which has none of
the gravity thresholds that would be required to prove a charge of crimes against
humanity. If that gap were closed, the result would be a more comprehensive assault on
the opportunities for impunity for both citizens and aliens found on U.S. territory.
VI. WAR CRIMES
¶39

It may seem remarkable to some that there are gaps in both U.S. federal law and
U.S. military law in the ability of federal courts and courts-martial and even military
commissions to prosecute war crimes. After all that has been experienced since the
precedents of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals and the scores of cases
prosecuted by the international criminal tribunals during the last seventeen years, one
would be forgiven to assume that surely in the United States the law is now well
established to enable U.S. courts (criminal and military) to investigate and prosecute the
full range of war crimes that have been codified in treaty law and defined as a matter of
customary international law. That, however, is not the case.
¶40
While there certainly are some war crimes that can be fully prosecuted under U.S.
law, there are many for which there is no jurisdiction in U.S. criminal law and there is
uncertain or vague jurisdiction in U.S. military law. The primary federal law, the War
Crimes Act of 1996, as amended in 1997 and again in 2006,54 is enforceable only in
circumstances where the perpetrator or the victim of the war crime is a U.S. citizen or a
member of the U.S. armed forces. An alien can be prosecuted only if the victim is a U.S.
citizen or a member of the U.S. armed forces. If an alien arrives in the United States
having committed war crimes against victims of a foreign nationality in foreign territory
or the alien commits such war crimes in U.S. territory, and the only victims are other
aliens, there is no basis for prosecuting that individual in a federal criminal court on war
crimes charges. (Of course, there may be grounds to bring charges for common crimes
against the alien unleashing violence on U.S. territory.) In contrast, modernized criminal
codes of some of America’s major allies now empower their criminal courts to prosecute
the full range of war crimes and to do so against a far wider range of potential defendants,
including aliens found in the prosecuting state’s territory.55
54

18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
For example, the United Kingdom criminalized all of the war crimes set forth in Article 8.2 of the Rome
Statute of the ICC (International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, § 50(1), May 11, 2001) and can
prosecute any alien who commits war crimes (or genocide or crimes against humanity) outside the United
Kingdom provided such person subsequently becomes resident in the United Kingdom (International
Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, § 68(1)).
55
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¶41

The most commonly-known group of war crimes—the “grave breaches” during
international armed conflicts under the 1949 Geneva Conventions56—could not be
prosecuted in federal courts against civilians and members of the U.S. armed forces until
enactment of the War Crimes Act of 1996. Thus, the grave breaches of torture, inhuman
treatment, biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering, destruction and
appropriation of property, compelling service in hostile forces, denying a fair trial,
unlawful deportation and transfer, unlawful confinement, and hostage-taking can, as of
1996, be prosecuted in U.S. federal courts but, remarkably, in fact never have been.57
The War Crimes Act of 1996 also empowers federal courts to prosecute civilians and
members of the U.S. armed forces for a group of war crimes sourced back to the Annex
to Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907).58
These war crimes consist of attacking undefended places, killing or wounding a person
hors de combat, improper use of a flag or truce, improper use of a flag, insignia or
uniform of the hostile party, treacherously killing or wounding, denying quarter,
destroying or seizing the enemy’s property, depriving the nationals of the hostile power of
rights or actions, compelling participation in military operations, pillaging, and
employing poison or poisoned weapons. Again, however, no such war crimes have ever
been prosecuted under the War Crimes Act of 1996.
¶42
In 1997, the War Crimes Act was amended to include violations of Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions.59 This meant that with respect to conduct during noninternational armed conflicts, all of the following violations could be, but never were,
prosecuted in U.S. federal courts between 1997 and 2006:





56

violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
taking of hostages; and
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as
indispensable.

Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, arts. 49-50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 33; Geneva Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts.
50-51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 86; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, arts. 129-30, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 146-47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 288.
57 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2006).
58 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague
Convention]; see 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2006).
59 The amended provision read: “(c) DEFINITION – As used in this section the term ‘war crime’ means
any conduct . . . (3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the international conventions
signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party
and which deals with non-international armed conflicts.” 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (as it was codified from
1997 to 2006).
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¶43

However, the United States regressed in this field of criminal law with enactment of
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”).60 The MCA decriminalized certain
war crimes set forth in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for purposes
of U.S. prosecution and thus created an impunity gap in U.S law.61 Specifically, the
following violations described in Common Article 3 can no longer be prosecuted in U.S.
courts following the nine-year period during which they had been criminalized:
“violence to life and person,” murder “of all kinds” (as opposed to the limited and
defined circumstances set forth in the MCA), “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” and “the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”
¶44
The MCA denies penal sanctions for certain conduct otherwise criminalized by the
MCA (murder, mutilation or maiming, and intentionally causing serious bodily injury) in
connection with the War Crimes Act of 1996 or with respect to crimes triable by the
military commissions, in the event such conduct occurs in connection with “collateral
damage” or “death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.”62 These terms are
left undefined and one is left to speculate why the designation of either consequence
necessarily extinguishes any criminal liability whatsoever. The long-standing rules of
distinction and proportionality in the law of war appear to be tested here.63 Interestingly,
in the criminal codes of various foreign jurisdictions and in the Rome Statute, a bright
line has been drawn on the issue of collateral damage. It is a war crime to intentionally
launch an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.64 The latter caveat, of “clearly
excessive” character, would be a difficult one to achieve for purposes of prosecution but
it is a standard that has gained widespread acceptance, including among the U.S. armed
forces. The MCA’s apparent “collateral damage” gap, one that apparently permits
collateral damage even if it is inflicted in a manner that is “clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated,” thus narrows the scope of
liability for war crimes under American law.
¶45
Despite what may appear to be an impressive compilation of war crimes that can be
prosecuted under the War Crimes Act of 1996, even in its truncated version following the
amendments to it under the MCA in 2006, there remain a significant number of war
crimes under customary international law, as confirmed in both the practice of the
international and hybrid criminal tribunals and the Rome Statute, that have not been
codified in U.S. law. In contrast, most, if not all, of these war crimes have been codified
in the criminal codes of some of America’s major allies, thus empowering them to
prosecute explicit war crimes, particularly with respect to their own nationals. The list
includes the following war crimes, stated in abbreviated form:
60

Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948(b) (2006).
Id. at § 6(b).
62 Id. at § 6(b)(3).
63 See RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 180-82
(2009).
64 Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
61
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(1) Pertaining to international armed conflicts:
























Attacking civilians
Attacking civilian objects
Attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission
Improper use of a flag, insignia or uniform of the United Nations
Improper use of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions
Transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation
or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory
within or outside this territory
Attacking protected objects
Mutilation
Medical or scientific experiments
Employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices
Employing prohibited bullets
Outrages upon personal dignity
Rape
Sexual slavery
Forced prostitution
Forced pregnancy
Enforced sterilization
Sexual violence
Using protected persons as human shields
Attacking objects or persons using the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions
Starvation as a method of warfare
Using, conscripting, or enlisting children

(2) Pertaining to non-international armed conflicts:
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Attacking civilians
Attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission
Attacking protected objects
Pillaging
Rape
Sexual slavery
Forced prostitution
Forced pregnancy
Forced sterilization
Sexual violence
Using, conscripting, and enlisting children
Displacing civilians
Treacherously killing or wounding
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Denying quarter
Mutilation
Medical or scientific experiments
Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property

¶46

While it remains possible through innovative interpretation of indictable common
crimes under the U.S. Code to prosecute an American citizen or a narrow range of aliens
for one or more common crimes that may overlap with one or more of these unindictable
war crimes, the haphazard methodology of any such prosecution in the context of war
crimes denies the United States the opportunity to prosecute such war crimes per se and
hence identifies the country as a virtual safe haven for those who commit such crimes.
The complexity of the exercise may explain why there has been no war crimes
prosecution under the War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended, and why no U.S. attorney
has sought to portray any prosecution in the federal courts as a war crimes prosecution.
¶47
When one examines the situation with respect to U.S. military courts, there exist
many uncertainties and largely a theoretical power to prosecute war crimes rather than
any significant precedent of doing so. Much would turn, if the opportunity arose, on the
military courts’ interpretation of the law of war under international law. Under 10 U.S.C.
§ 818, general courts-martial “have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war
is subject to trial by a military tribunal.” This general provision is elaborated on in the
Manual for Courts-Martial United States, which states: “General courts-martial may try
any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunal for any crime
against: (a) The law of war. . . .”65 The Manual also provides, “Nothing in this rule limits
the power of general courts-martial to try persons under the law of war.”66 In addition,
jurisdiction resides with military commissions and other military tribunals of “concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
be tried” by them.67 The reach of U.S. military courts and military commissions over
civilians in certain circumstances, enemy belligerents of either military or civilian
character, or foreign nationals of countries not at war with the United States remains
problematic and may turn on how well-established a particular war crime is under
principles of universal jurisdiction in international law.68
¶48
Rather than try to parse the myriad of possibilities for military court jurisdiction
over the commission of war crimes by U.S. nationals of civilian or military character or
by aliens of any number of different characterizations, I emphasize one point: it is not
possible to extract from the UCMJ, Title 10 of the United States Code, or the
jurisprudence of U.S. military courts any definitive list of explicit war crimes which such
military courts are empowered to prosecute against U.S. military personnel, enemy
belligerents, or civilians engaged or caught up in hostilities or on occupied territory. One
exception is the MCA. Military Commissions established thereunder are empowered to
prosecute “any offense made punishable by [and defined in the MCA] or the law of war
when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September
65
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11, 2001.”69 Although a detailed list of triable offenses that cover many explicit war
crimes is set forth in the MCA,70 that list does not include all established war crimes, and
thus the Commissions’ supplemental jurisdiction over the “law of war” may need to
trigger the prosecution of additional war crimes in the future.
¶49
The UCMJ Article 32 investigations71 and, in some cases, courts-martial of U.S.
service personnel arising from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not,
to date, been grounded on charges of war crimes, even though on the surface many of the
incidents might invite serious scrutiny as possible war crimes and certainly, to the rest of
world, appear to exhibit characteristics of war crimes. Rather, these investigations and
courts-martial have relied upon the punitive articles of the UCMJ,72 few of which
constitute a war crime per se and are more properly understood as common crimes that
may be committed by American soldiers. Typical charges in connection with cases
arising from Iraq or Afghanistan are assault, failure to obey an order or regulation,
murder, cruelty and maltreatment, dereliction of duty, manslaughter, rape, and conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman—all charges that also could be brought as crimes
against fellow soldiers or civilians in the United States. Because the UCMJ does not
have a clearly identifiable list of war crimes in its punitive articles (perhaps one that
could read “Acts Against the Laws and Customs of War”), it remains difficult to describe
the military justice system as one focused on, or even defined by, the prosecution of war
crimes. The primary exception in the UCMJ, discussed above, turns on trials governed
by the “law of war,” an option rarely invoked by military courts.
¶50
In 2005, U.S. Air Force Major Mynda L.G. Ohman, Staff Judge Advocate at RAF
Croughton, United Kingdom, wrote an excellent article in the Air Force Law Review
about Titles 10 and 18 of the U.S. Code. She summarized how antiquated the UCMJ has
become in the context of war crimes prosecutions:
Violations of a federal criminal statue, such as the War Crimes Act, may be
tried before courts-martial. Article 134 of the UCMJ, the "general article,"
allows the military to import non-capital federal criminal statutes and charge
them in a military court-martial. This broadens the subject matter of criminal
offenses available to military courts. Not only are the punitive articles of the
UCMJ available to the military prosecutor, any federal criminal statute that
applies where the crime was committed could also be charged under the
general article. For example, this provision would generally allow military
authorities to incorporate the War Crimes Act into military prosecutions and
charge U.S. service members with certain war crimes.
While the UCMJ has the flexibility to import federal law into trials by courtsmartial, it has its limits. Courts have interpreted the language of the general
article to bar importation of federal capital crimes into UCMJ proceedings.
Where federal civilian courts have jurisdiction over criminal offenses that
authorize the death penalty, these same Title 18 crimes may not be brought
69
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before a court-martial under Article 134. Turning again to the War Crimes
Act, for the most serious war crimes—those in which the victim dies as a
result of the accused's conduct—the statute authorizes the death penalty. Such
crimes cannot be charged as war crimes in a trial by court-martial, and
military prosecutors must charge the underlying conduct as a violation of
another punitive article.
The reliance on Title 10 to prosecute war crimes creates an anomaly. The
Department of Defense (DoD) is normally the agency that prosecutes
members of the U.S. armed forces. Federal criminal law allows for
punishment of certain war crimes, yet the application of Title 18 war crimes
is severely restricted in military courts-martial. The effect of this limitation is
that courts-martial must continue to largely rely on the offenses defined by
Title 10, instead of Title 18, when charging crimes that occur during an armed
conflict. As a result, the most egregious crimes under the laws of war
committed by U.S. military members are charged as often less severe
common crimes under the UCMJ. For example, the intentional, fatal shooting
of a person protected by the Geneva Conventions will likely be charged as
murder under Article 118, and torture will likely be charged as an aggravated
assault under Article 128. Compared to Title 18 crimes, war-related offenses
tried by courts-martial will often carry lower maximum penalties.73
¶51

Among the various options for how to modernize the UCMJ, Major Ohman
proposed “adding a new war crimes article to the UCMJ to: 1) align the UCMJ with
existing federal criminal law; 2) better insulate U.S. military members from the use of
military commissions; and 3) enjoy the preventive benefit of having a separate article that
specifically defines and punishes war-related crimes.”74 If such a new war crimes article,
with particularity, were incorporated in the UCMJ, it would enable the U.S. government
to confirm the war crimes which now exist under customary and codified international
law. The new UCMJ article also should mirror those war crimes fully listed and
incorporated into Title 18 as a matter of federal criminal law. The new UCMJ article
should incorporate a comprehensive listing of crimes against humanity in the event Title
18 were to be amended to include such crimes, as the Crimes Against Humanity Act of
2009 seeks to accomplish.
VII. CONCLUSION

¶52

The federal criminal code and military code exhibit significant gaps in their
respective coverage of atrocity crimes, particularly crimes against humanity and war
crimes—categories of crimes that have evolved rapidly in international criminal law and
human rights law during the last seventeen years. Other major nations—America’s
allies—have modernized their codes to enable their courts to prosecute the full range of
atrocity crimes, thus reflecting their democratic choice to strengthen the rule of law in
73 Mynda L.G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 57 A.F.L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2005).
74 Id. at 6.
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their own societies. Such modernizing exercises also reflect their pragmatic choice to
minimize the exposure of the nationals of such nations to the scrutiny of international
criminal tribunals, because national courts will be able to shoulder that responsibility.
¶53
Progress has been made to modernize the federal criminal code through the
enactment of the Genocide Accountability Act, the Child Soldiers Accountability Act, and
the Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act. There remains a need to amend Title 18
of the U.S. Code so that the full range of crimes against humanity and war crimes can be
prosecuted in federal courts without any question as to the ability of such courts to
exercise complete subject matter jurisdiction over such international crimes. The Crimes
Against Humanity Act of 2009 would advance that objective considerably. Amendments
to Title 10 of the U.S. Code would enable military courts to fully prosecute war crimes
and crimes against humanity.
¶54
The jurisdiction of federal criminal courts should extend to all U.S. nationals who
perpetrate atrocity crimes anywhere in the world and to any alien who commits an
atrocity crime in the United States or anywhere else in the world and, in the latter
situation, who also is present on U.S. territory. None of the atrocity crimes should be
shielded behind any statute of limitations. It is fortunate that the Genocide
Accountability Act honors that principle and that the Crimes Against Humanity Act of
2009 would, if enacted, also be free of any statute of limitations.
¶55
Filling the gaps in American law pertaining to atrocity crimes would demonstrate
that the United States has the confidence to reject impunity for such crimes and to hold its
own nationals, as well as foreign nationals over whom U.S. courts should be exercising
personal jurisdiction, to account. The United States would no longer be a safe haven in
reality for untold numbers of perpetrators of atrocity crimes. The process of amending
Title 18 already has begun and should be continued. Title 10 awaits further examination
by appropriate committees of the Congress. The United States should achieve equal
footing with many of its allies that already have recast their criminal law to reflect the
reality of international criminal and humanitarian law in our own time.
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